In the European energy policy debate, tradable green certificates (TGC) have been suggested to be a superior regulatory framework for promoting the diffusion of renewable energy technologies. The purpose of this paper is to assess the performance of the Swedish TGC system, contributing to the European debate on the suitability of different types of frameworks. The expectations of the TGC system were that it would: a) be effective in terms of increasing the output of "green" electricity; b) ensure that this was done in a cost effective manner (from both a social and a consumer perspective); c) generate an equitable distribution of costs and benefits and d) drive technical change. So far, it has performed adequately in terms of effectiveness and cost effectiveness in social terms. However, consumer costs have been substantially higher than expected, very large rents are generated and, at best, it drives technical change in a marginal way only. Given this outcome, a TGC framework should be selected if the overriding concern is to minimize short term social costs of reaching a certain goal with a high degree of predictability. However, it would be wrong to expect that TGC should also drive technical change, keep consumer costs down and be equitable. There are, thus, trade-offs involved which need to be revealed and not obscured by analysts.
Introduction

1
For more than a decade, the European Union has recognised the need to tackle the challenges of climate change. Initially, EU outlined a 15 percent reduction target for greenhouse gas emissions by the year 2010, as from the 1990 level (European Commission, 1997) . Since energy generation is a prominent source of CO 2 emissions, an increased use of renewable energy, in particular electricity produced from renewable energy sources, was considered an important condition for reaching this target (European Commission, 1997; European Parliament and Council, 2001 ).
Partly as a consequence, a 21 percent target for renewable electricity penetration by 2010 was adopted by the European Parliament and Council (2001) . Whereas EU member states seem to be making good progress in meeting this target, much stronger efforts will be needed to reach the new reduction targets for greenhouse gas emission set in 2007, which calls for a 60-80 percent reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 (European Parliament, 2007 . This accentuates the question of which government policy instruments are likely to be effective in stimulating the required investments in renewable electricity generation equipment, such as wind turbines, photovoltaic cells and biomass combined heat and power plants. 2 For a couple of decades, various regulatory frameworks have been experimented with to stimulate investments in such renewable energy technologies. Two main types of policy instruments have been deployed: feed-in tariffs and tradable green certificates-based quotas (TGCs). In countries with feed-in tariffs, owners of distribution networks are required to accept renewable electricity fed into the network and pay a fixed, regulated price (or price premium) for that electricity. This type of system was adopted by Denmark in the 1980s and by Germany and Spain in the 1990s, and is now the dominant system in the EU15 (cf. e.g. Rowlands, 2005; Rickerson et al., 2007; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008) .
Based on the experiences of these and other countries, several assessments of the efficiency and effectiveness of feed-in tariffs have been published. 4 The main advantage of this system, as described in these assessments, is its effectiveness in promoting technology diffusion and development (especially with regards to wind power in e.g. Germany and Spain).
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In tradable green certificate-based quota systems (TGCs), renewable electricity is sold in the usual electricity market at market prices, but these sales are complemented by certificate trading in a separate market for green certificates. The certificates are demanded by obligated buyers (e.g. electricity suppliers or consumers) who must buy certificates corresponding to a certain quota of their total electricity sales or consumption. Here, countries such as Belgium (Flanders), Sweden and the UK have been early adopters. According to the received academic literature (most of which are based on either theoretical assumptions or simulation approaches), the expected main advantages of TGCs are that they (1) are cost-efficient, (2) ensure a stable development towards set deployment goals and (3) drive innovation and costreduction through "double" competition in both electricity and certificate markets. However, it is still very much unclear whether certificate systems can meet these expectations; in previous assessments it has been concluded that the experiences of these systems are too limited to allow for a thorough analysis of their performance (cf. Menanteau et al., 2003) . 7 However, after six years of operation, there is now enough data to make an assessment of the performance of the Swedish "electricity certificate system" so far. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to assess the performance of the Swedish TGC system and,
thereby, contribute to the European-level debate on the suitability of different types of systems for the support of renewable electricity.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we summarise the expectations on TGCs from the perspectives of the EU Commission, the European Parliament and the Swedish government. Based on these expectations, we identify four criteria for assessing the 4 Cf, e.g., Morthorst, 2000; Menanteau et al., 2003; Meyer, 2003; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2004; Madlener and Stagl, 2005; Ragwitz and Huber, 2005; Rowlands, 2005; Contaldi et al., 2006; Ringel, 2006; Finon and Perez, 2007; del Río and Gual, 2007; Diekman, 2008; Verhaegen et al., 2009. 5 The main disadvantages that are mentioned are that (1) the fixed tariff system can become very expensive for the electricity consumers/tax payers, (2) the windfall profits can be high, (3) the system cannot guarantee that a certain amount of renewable electricity will be provided at a certain time and (4) the incentives for cost reductions are sometimes insufficient (cf. Menanteau et al., 2003; Meyer, 2003; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2004; Madlener and Stagl, 2005; Ragwitz and Huber, 2005; Rowlands, 2005; Contaldi et al., 2006; Ringel, 2006; Finon and Perez, 2007; Verhaegen et al., 2009) . 6 Cf. Morthorst, 2000; Menanteau et al., 2003; Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2004; Madlener and Stagl, 2005; Contaldi et al., 2006; Ringel, 2006; del Río and Gual, 2007; Verhaegen et al., 2009. 7 For an exception, see Verbruggen (2004 Verbruggen ( , 2009 performance of the Swedish TGC system: (1) effectiveness (achieved new electricity generation), (2) cost effectiveness (both social and consumer cost to achieve the target) (3) equity and (4) effect on technical change. In section 3, the design of the Swedish TGC system is described. The performance of the system in terms of effectiveness and costs to achieve the target is analysed in section 4. In section 5, we turn to the issue of equity, where the focus is on various rents (unjustifiably high profits). In section 6, we discuss the system's effect on technical change. We end the paper with a concluding discussion of the lessons learned.
Tradable green certificates in the European and Swedish policy debate: Expectations and assessment criteria
In this section, we develop the criteria by which we assess the Swedish TGC system. We begin with outlining the expectations formed by the European Commission in the second half of the 1990s, simply since these were very influential for the later Swedish choice of regulatory framework (Åstrand, 2005) . We proceed with specifying the expectations of the Swedish government, as expressed in a number of government bills and in a central parliamentary enquiry. On the basis of these expectations, we formulate the four assessment criteria.
Policy expectations on TGCs at the EU level
Against the background of a belief in a growing importance of renewable electricity in the European power balance, a report from the European Commission (1998) pointed to advantages of a harmonisation in terms of support schemes for renewables in Europe. As a consequence, it identified a need to determine the relative merits and disadvantages of the different approaches in the Member States. The results of a largely theoretical assessment of various support schemes were reported in 1999 in a Commission working paper (cf. European Commission, 1999), which made it very clear the Commission advocated a quota, or "competitive-based", system.
A number of expected advantages of such systems were identified. They would (i) be compatible with the EU treaty rules, (ii) provide a "considerable" level of security (depending on design) and (iii) ensure static efficiency, i.e. "… that electricity is generated and sold at minimum cost" (European Commission, 1999, p. 15, our italics) . The expectations referred, thus, to cost efficiency in terms of not only social costs but also in terms of consumer costs, 8 which is not surprising considering that low electricity prices for consumers is one of the three main goals of EU environmental-energy policy (Sáenz de Miera et al., 2008) . 9 This goal is also reflected in the Renewables Directive, where one of the main arguments in favour of a future pan-European support scheme is to keep consumer costs down:
Such a framework would "enable electricity from renewable energy sources to compete with electricity produced from non-renewable energy sources and limit the cost to the consumer, while, in the medium-term, reduce the need for public support" (European Parliament and Council, 2001 , p. 34, our emphasis).
In part, the focus on consumer costs stem from a worry that too high prices for consumers would erode public support for increasing generation of renewable electricity:
"Once a significant level of renewables generated electricity develops, and the consequent price uplift to overall electricity tariffs becomes appreciable, the need to demonstrate 'value for money' /…/ becomes increasingly vital if continued public support for large levels of Reselectricity is to be maintained". (European Commission, 1999, p. 16) Finally, in contrast to a feed-in solution, a quota based scheme was expected to (iv) stimulate innovation:
"As the system [feed-in tariff schemes] is not one based on direct competition ... the incentive for innovation must, by definition, be less pronounced than under a scheme that is based on competition." (European Commission, 1999, p. 16) "[Q]uota/competition-based schemes have been the most effective in the EU in driving down prices for renewable generated electricity and, according to economic theory, as a result of the competition, stimulating innovation." (European Commission, 1999, p. 18) .
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In spite of these powerful expectations, the Commission was not ready to suggest a harmonised quota-based system. In the proposal for a directive on the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources, it was argued that although a harmonised European-level support scheme would be beneficial, the experiences of different support schemes were too
limited to conclude which model should form the basis of an internal market for renewable 8 The inclusion of consumer costs in the concept of cost efficiency is also clear from the working paper's critique of the feed-in system: "Indeed, the major disadvantage of fixed feed-in tariffs identified during the Commission's analysis relates to the static efficiency of such schemes. As can be seen from the pricing information …, fixed feed-in tariff schemes have failed to produce price reductions for Res-electricity." (European Commission, 1999, p. 16) 9 The other two are reduction of CO 2 emissions and increase in the deployment of renewable electricity generation (Sáenz de Miera et al., 2008) . 10 Their main drawback was that they were not that effective in terms of increasing renewable electricity generation. However, the main quota system examined in the report was the UK tendering system, and the report also highlighted that there were other options, most notably a new system based on green certificates which had not yet been implemented in any EU country, and it was noted that "one advantage of such an approach over tendering schemes is that it results in a constant competitive pressure being exerted on generators, which can only result in improved dynamic efficiency" (European Commission, 1999, p. 20). electricity, "in particular with regard to the innovative 'green certificate' system …" (European Commission, 2000, p. 6 ).
Policy expectations of TGC in Sweden
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The policy expectations in Sweden overlap to a very large degree with those of the EU. 12 A first expectation of the Swedish TGC system was to substantially increase the share of electricity generated from renewable energy sources:
"The certificates are, thus, a means which primarily relate to the goal of increasing the share of electricity from renewable energy sources. The objective of this goal is, in the long run, to obtain a sustainable energy system built on renewable energy sources. In Sweden, such a development is necessary in order to manage the transition of the energy system in connection with the phasing out of nuclear power" (SOU 2001:77, p. 108-109 ).
An initial goal of adding 10 TWh 'green' power to the power balance by 2010 was a response to the European Parliament and Council (2001) directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources. This goal was subsequently raised to 17 TWh by 2016 and a new target of 25 TWh by 2020 was recently suggested by the Swedish
Government (2009).
A second expectation was that the expansion in the supply of 'green' power was to be done in a cost efficient manner through the TGC system. As in the Commission working paper referred to above, the concept of "cost" included both the social cost and consumer cost. With respect to social cost, we can refer to an influential Parliamentary enquiry:
"An efficient promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources implies ... that the total cost ... shall be as low as possible. An efficient solution that is adjusted to the conditions of the market is to let the quota rise gradually. Investments with low marginal cost will be included first and only thereafter will investments with a higher marginal cost be included." (SOU 2001:77, p. 125) 13
The emphasis on cost efficiency reflected, however, also a strong perceived need of keeping the costs for the electricity consumers down:
14 11 All quotes in this section are our translations. 12 In particular, European Commission (1999) appears to have had a major influence on Swedish policy documents. The core arguments in favour of TGC were drawn from that paper and reproduced in both SOU 2001:77 (a key Government committee of inquiry) and in the Government bill introducing the certificate system (Swedish Government, 2000) . 13 See also a later Government bill: "A basic idea in the system is that the price of the certificates shall mirror marginal costs for a new investment ... for the production of renewable power. This means that investments which are most cost efficient and most simple shall be implemented first" (Swedish Government, 2006a, p. 29) . 14 An interview with a senior member of the Ministry of Industry clarified that the expectation on the Swedish TGC was that it would minimise consumer costs (Thornström, 2005) .
"The costs of the support system must be kept down in order for it to achieve acceptance among the public, to maintain the competitive strength of industry and an improved competitiveness of the renewable energy sources." (Swedish Government, 2002a, p. 88) The concern for electricity consumers is also demonstrated by the implementation of a limited quota obligation fee (a penalty fee for obligated buyers who fail to meet their obligation) that prevented the certificate price from shooting up (cf. SOU 2001:77, p. 173; Swedish Government, 2002b, p. 117) . This focus on consumer costs, in addition to social cost, mirrors that in the European Commission (1999) and European Parliament and Council (2001) and is related to the issue of equity, i.e. the fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits between different actor groups. A main concern was, therefore, to avoid overcompensation of the power industry (Swedish Government, 2000, p. 14) . It was, hence, clearly specified that the TGC scheme should only support renewable power production that was not commercially competitive (Swedish Government, 2000, p. 20-21; 2002b, p. 40) .
A third expectation of the Swedish TGC scheme was that it would increase the competitiveness of electricity from renewable energy sources through technical change (Swedish Government, 2002a) . The expectations were that a TGC scheme would be an elegant solution to obtaining the twin benefits of cost efficiency and technical change:
"The transition to market based solutions to promote power from renewable energy sources means that conditions are created for an effective competition between different forms of power from renewable energy sources. An effective competition leads to cost efficiency and to the development of new technical solutions" (SOU 2001:77, p . 104, our italics).
Criteria for assessing the performance of the Swedish TGC system
Comparing the expectations of a TGC system, in Sweden and on the EU-level, 15 there is a substantial agreement in terms of what the most important criteria to consider are: (1) effectiveness (ability to increase renewable electricity generation/meet targets), (2) costs efficiency, in terms of both social cost and consumer cost, (3) equity (avoiding overcompensation) 16 and (4) the ability to stimulate technical change and drive costs down in the longer term. 17 We will now define these criteria more precisely.
Effectiveness is measured as the amount of new renewable electricity production generated in the TGC system relative to the expectations, using official data from the Swedish Energy 15 These expectations overlap, of course, with those in the academic literature (see Introduction) 16 The issue of equity is not explicitly dealt with in the EU document referred to above but follows from the focus on keeping consumer costs down. 17 A fifth criterion is compatibility with rules of the internal market and state aid which we will leave out of this assessment.
Agency and Svenska Kraftnät. 18 We also use qualitative sources to discuss the extent to which this new production can be seen as an outcome of the TGC system rather than of other incentives. The results of this analysis are given in Section 4.1.
Cost-efficiency is assessed by the achievement of a prior determined target at a minimum cost and we label this the cost-effectiveness of the system (cf. del Río and Gual, 2007) . 19 The costeffectiveness in terms of the social cost of the system is discussed in Section 4.1 (although this is played down in relation to the following criteria). In line with the concern for consumer costs 20 revealed in Swedish and EU policy documents (see Section 2.1 and 2.2), we also include measurements related to the total cost for the consumers, including transaction costs.
In Section 4.2, we use official data supplied by the Swedish Energy Agency as the basis of an analysis of the total gross cost for the consumers in relation to the expectations and transaction costs paid to electricity suppliers.
In Section 5, we turn to the issue of equity, i.e. how the benefits of promotion are shared between actors (i.e. who receives support and for what type of investments). We analyse the rents/producer surplus generated in the system, i.e. various types of "abnormal" and unearned profits that benefit electricity producers at the expense of electricity consumers (cf. Verbruggen, 2004 Verbruggen, , 2008 Finon and Perez, 2007) . We define and discuss the concept of 'rents' and our estimation method in further detail in Section 5.
Finally, the system's ability to foster technological development will be assessed on the basis of an analysis where insights from modern innovation research are applied to the field of renewable electricity (Section 6).
Essentials of the Swedish TGC system
The Swedish TGC system came into force on 1 May 2003. The system has two main components: (1) a right for producers of renewable electricity to receive certificates and (2) a quota obligation for electricity consumers/suppliers (excluding the energy-intensive industry), creating a demand for the certificates.
Certificates for producers of renewable electricity
Producers of electricity from selected renewable sources receive one "electricity certificate"
for each MWh of renewable electricity they produce. The system includes existing and new The certificates can be traded in a special "certificate market". This generates an income stream in addition to that stemming from sales of the electricity (on the conventional electricity market). Holders of certificates can also choose to "bank" the certificates and sell them later on. Since all eligible electricity production receive the same amount of certificates per MWh, all types of electricity sources receive the same amount of support. This implies that a common, "technology neutral" market is created, in which the eligible renewable electricity sources compete with each other directly and investments occur in stages depending on the cost level of different sources. The basic idea is that the certificate price at a certain point in time will correspond to the additional cost (in comparison to conventional power production) of the marginal renewable power plant in the system. 
Quota obligation and quota levels
Each year by April 1 st , all obligated buyers have to hold, and hand over to the state, certificates corresponding to a certain share (quota) of their total electricity consumption/sales the previous year. Originally, this obligation referred to the electricity consumers, but in the 2006 revision it was moved to the electricity suppliers (with some exceptions). Electricity consumed in the manufacturing process in electricity-intensive industries or produced in small (<50 kW) plants is wholly or partly exempted. 23 In total, approximately two thirds (100 TWh) of the total electricity use in Sweden is included in the certificate system.
The quota is decided by the Swedish Parliament. Originally, it was set to increase from 7.4 percent of consumed/invoiced electricity in 2003 to 16.9 percent in 2010 (see Table 3 .1). This was estimated to correspond to 10 TWh increase in renewable electricity production in comparison to the 2002 level. In 2006, the quota was adjusted to correspond to the new target of 17 TWh by 2016. 24 The development of the quota takes into consideration the phase-out of plants that are no longer eligible for support (as described above).
Obligated buyers that do not meet their obligation are required to pay a penalty to the state.
This "quota obligation fee" currently amounts to 150 percent of the average certificate price in the previous accounting period. Government (2002b Government ( , 2006a .
System outcomes I: effectiveness and costs
In this section, we begin our assessment of the Swedish TGC system. Section 4.1 contains a description of the effectiveness of the system in terms of added supply of renewable electricity in comparison to the expectations and discusses to what extent the social cost of achieving the set target has been reasonable. Section 4.2 briefly describes the system's performance in terms of consumer costs and the transaction costs. Table 3 .1).
New renewable electricity production 2003-2008 and social costs of the system
Thus, the Swedish TGC system has not quite met the expectations, but seems to have been reasonably effective. Most of the production increase has been achieved in plants that were already in operation in The low share of output from new plants is, of course, not surprising since it takes a number of years for the power industry to react to new incentives, to get permits for new power plants and for the capital goods industry to deliver these. Thus, to get a more complete picture of the outcomes of the TGC system, we also need to look at planned investments. Here, it is clear that the TGC system has stimulated a great interest in the paper and pulp industry and among utilities to make further investments in biomass CHP plants. This has been particularly evident after the extension of the system to 2030 (Hirsmark and Larsson, 2005; Jacobsson, 2008) . The interest for investments in wind power has also increased, although there are still substantial obstacles for wind power deployment in terms of e.g. a slow permit process (Michanek and Söderholm, 2006) and the limited capacity of the global wind turbine industry to supply wind turbines (Swedish Energy Agency, 2007a ).
This increased interest to invest in renewable electricity production is, however, also due to other factors. Investment decisions are made in a very complex reality, and may be influenced by a large number of different factors. These include increases in electricity prices in recent years (partly driven by the Emission Trading System in the EU), various investment support 
Consumer costs and transaction costs 2003-2007
In the first five (almost) years, the Swedish TGC system has resulted in (gross) consumer costs 31 of 14.8 billion SEK (approx. 1.6 billion € 32 ). In relation to the total amount of quota- Hirsmark and Larsson (2007) report that 63 percent of the CHP producers claim that the TGC system has had a decisive influence on their investment decisions and that 23 percent agree that the system has had some influence. Moreover, Michanek and Söderholm (2007) show that the TGC system is of crucial importance to investments in new wind power plants. 29 According to Swedish Energy Agency (2008), there are many planned projects that are likely to be implemented in the next few years, especially since the current price of certificates makes investment in further renewable production more favourable. However, the TGC system also faces a number of challenges in the future, most notably the issue of whether the expected extensive overhaul and updating for existing plants will be entitled to a further allocation period of certificates. 30 The Swedish Energy Agency (2008) suggests that the increase in production is likely to be 13.8 TWh by 2012, which is above expectations (see table 3.1). 31 It should be noted that all calculations of consumer costs concern gross costs. The net consumer costs may very well be lower than the gross cost, due to the interaction between the TGC system and the conventional electricity market: When a separate market for renewable electricity is created (as in the Swedish TGC) and electricity demand is stable, the most expensive conventional electricity production may be out-competed and the producer surplus decrease. According to a recently published study, this effect has been clearly evident in Germany (BMU, 2007) . Similarly, Sáenz de Miera et al. (2008) have recently shown that the increase in the costs of renewable electricity support may be offset by the short/medium-term reduction in the wholesale electricity price, leading to a reduction of retail electricity prices. However, it has not been possible for us in this paper to take this type of interaction effects into consideration. The consumer cost can be divided into the following main components:
• value-added tax (VAT) paid to the state
• quota obligation fees (penalty fee for obligated buyers who fail to meet their obligation)
paid to the state
• administrative and transaction costs
• support to producers of renewable electricity (payment received for certificates)
The distribution between the different components is shown in Yet, the largest cost item is, of course, payments to the producers for traded certificates that have been cancelled, which amounted to 9.9 billions SEK (67 %). We will now turn to analyse the extent to which these are constituted by various types of rents rather than "wellearned" compensation for higher production costs of renewable electricity in comparison to conventional electricity. 33 In the first five years, the equilibrium price for certificates was expected to be 60-150 SEK/certificate (SOU 2001:77, p. 146) , which would correspond to an average cost for certificates of 0.006-0.015 SEK/kWh on all consumed electricity (cf. SOU 2001:77 p. 175-176) . 34 According to Swedish official statistics, the higher than expected certificate price has not been compensated for by lower electricity prices. 35 It should also be noted that the official data only include transaction costs of electricity suppliers. To these should be added the transaction costs of electricity producers and consumers, which are probably higher than those of the electricity producers (cf. Van der Linden et al., 2005; Kåberger et al., 2004) . 
System outcomes II: equity and rent generation
The principal idea of a TGC system is that the payment producers of renewable electricity receive from selling the certificates they are awarded should cover the extra costs involved in producing renewable electricity in comparison with conventional electricity. The certificate price should, thus, correspond to the difference between the marginal cost of renewables 36 at the determined quantity Q (mc*) and the market price for electricity (PE) (see Figure 5 .1). The target quantity Q has a corresponding marginal cost of mc*. If the market price for 36 As explained in section 3.1, the 'marginal cost of renewables' refer in this context to the cost of the marginal renewable power plant in the system. electricity is PE, then the certificate price will be equal to the difference between mc* and PE. Schaeffer et al. (1999)) However, for some plants payments are expected to exceed the extra cost. The producer surplus generated by such plants constitutes a "rent". 37 In previous literature, these rents are often referred to as "windfall profits" (e.g. Verbruggen, 2004; Finon and Perez, 2007) , since they are unearned and largely uncontrolled by the profiting parties.
Figure 5.1: A schematic illustration of a TGC system (Adapted from
We may distinguish between two types of rents. The first type is generated in plants which
were already profitable without the extra payments provided via the certificate market (i.e. the renewable electricity up to quantity A in Figure 5 .1). For these producers, the system creates an extra profit which does not correspond to any extra achievement on their part (the difference between mc* and PE in Figure 5 .1).
The second type occurs due to the fact that the overall marginal cost curve for renewables consists of several different curves, one for each technology (see Figure 5 .2). At each point in time, the certificate price will correspond to the most expensive technology included in the system (the "marginal" technology), and all technologies with lower costs will, thus, receive an extra profit. As more and more expensive technologies are required to fill the quota obligation, an increasing share of the funds transferred from consumers to producers will be rents to sub-marginal producers (cf. Verbruggen, 2004) . Figure 5 .2 illustrates how the marginal cost mc*, corresponding to the cost of technology C at target quantity Q, produces rents for technology A (light grey area), technology B (medium grey area) and some plants within technology C (dark grey area).
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In the following, we will estimate the size of these two types of rents in the Swedish TGC system. 37 Verbruggen (2009) makes a distinction between "real rents" and "excess (swindle) profits". The former are differential (Ricardian) rents within a technology group that are the result of natural endowments and/or higher proficiency of some producers. The latter are created by differences in costs between technologies included in the same support scheme. Verbruggen (2008) argues that the rents created in TGC systems are better described as "swindle profits", 38 In the terminology of Verbruggen (2008) , the rents produced "within" each technology (due to different cost levels between plants of the same type, e.g. wind turbines) constitute "real" (Ricardian) rents rather than "excess profits". 
Type I rents: Payments to already profitable electricity production plants
Due to some particularities of the Swedish TGC system, Type I rents currently constitute a major part of the total rents generated. First, as mentioned previously a number of already existing production plants were included in the system from the start, with the right to receive certificates for 10-12 years (to 2012 or 2014). One reason for their inclusion was to ensure enough liquidity in the certificate market (cf. SOU 2001:77). Another reason was to prevent existing biomass plants to switch back to fossil fuels (SOU 2001:77) . 39 Some of the existing plants that were included in the system had previously received investment subsidies and/or production support, whereas others (especially some industrial plants) had been built without any government support. Most of this production was already competitive or at least needed far less support than entirely new production plants.
Second, there was a relatively large potential for "easily accessible" production increases in existing CHP plants, for example through fuel conversion and increase in the number of fullload hours. Although some of these increases required investments, these were much lower than the investments in new wind turbines or CHP plants that would come to determine the certificate price level.
In order to capture these two sources of Type I rents, we make two estimations. In the first, we only include the rents to existing renewable electricity production in 2002 (6.5 TWh according to the Swedish Energy Agency (2007b). For existing production in 2002, we assume an extra cost of 0 SEK/kWh, since most of these plants were already profitable.
In our second estimation, we also include the "easily accessible" production increases in existing plants. Here, we use data on the actual electricity production in these plants in 2006 (10.8 TWh according to the Swedish Energy Agency (2007b)). 40 We use this number since it corresponds well to the sum of total production in 2002 and the short-term bio power potential identified by the Government committee of inquiry responsible for suggesting a design for a future certificate system (SOU 2001:77) . 41 We assume that these plants will be phased out 42 The first two estimates are, therefore, quite likely on the low side, whereas the third seems more realistic.
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5 .1. According to our calculations (see Appendix B), the Swedish TGC system has already (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) produced Type I rents in the order of 8-11 billion SEK (830-1,160 M€), where the higher figure is more reasonable considering the easily accessible production increases discussed previously. These rents constitute up to as much as 79 percent of the total payments to electricity producers (approx.
14 billion SEK).
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For the period of 2009-2014, our calculations indicate that Type I rents may amount to 5-7 billion SEK (if we only include the existing production) or 8-13 billion SEK (if we also include the "easily accessible" production). In total, the Type I rents may amount to 12-23 billion SEK (1.3-2.4 billion €) in the period of 2003-2014. Again, considering that the average price was SEK 288 in the last year and the quite low estimate of the "easily accessible" production, the highest figure (assuming a certificate price of 300 SEK/certificate and 10.8
TWh of existing and "easily accessible" production) is not at all unrealistic. In such a case, Type I rents would amount to about 58 percent of the total payments to producers in the period of 2003-2014 (see Appendix C). 
Type II rents: Overcompensation to sub-marginal producers as more expensive renewable electricity technologies are introduced in the system
As technologies with higher costs have to be introduced to meet the quota obligation, the certificate price will increase above the cost of the previously marginal renewable power plant in the system. The size of the rents generated is obviously dependent on the size of the quota, the potential of the "cheaper" production technologies and the cost difference between different technologies in the specific country. In the Swedish case, the cheapest new renewable electricity production is bio power and land-based wind power. However, if there is a need to introduce off-shore wind power (or other more expensive production technologies) in the Swedish TGC system to meet the quota obligation, substantial
Type II rents may be generated for producers of bio power and land-based wind power. This may be the case if the quota obligation is increased or if land-based wind power diffusion is blocked by remaining difficulties in obtaining building permits. Both these events are highly probable. Indeed, the Swedish government recently announced its intentions to raise the quota to 25 TWh by 2020 in order to increase the share of renewable power substantially:
To reduce vulnerability and increase the security of supply, a third leg needs to be developed for electricity supply, thereby reducing the dependence on nuclear and hydro power. To achieve this, combined heat and power, wind power and other renewable power production must account for a substantial share of the power production. (Swedish Government, 2009, p. 3, our translation) Although it is not clear what "substantial" is, it would not be unreasonable to interpret this as "one third" considering that renewable sources are described as "a third leg" of the future Swedish electricity supply. This would require a contribution of renewable electricity sources of about 50 TWh. Thus, although we cannot say with any certainty when Type II rents may appear in the Swedish TGC system, it is clear that they will appear sooner or later.
To give an indication of the size of the potential Type II rents, we assume that off-shore wind power (or another technology with a corresponding cost level) will be introduced in the system starting in 2015. According to an early estimate by the Swedish Energy Agency (2005b), the introduction of off-shore wind power could result in certificate prices of up to 370 SEK/certificate. In a more recent report by the same Agency, it is suggested that the certificate price would have to be doubled (from approx. 250 SEK/MWh) in order for offshore wind power to be profitable (Swedish Energy Agency, 2007c) . In our estimate, we assume, therefore, a certificate price of 500 SEK/MWh. This price results in an overcompensation to plants built 2003-2007 and 2008-2014 . We assume that these will be 
Conclusions: Total rents and their share of payments to producers
To sum up, the Swedish TGC system has already produced Type I rents (i.e.
overcompensation to already existing production) in the order of 8-11 billion SEK, equalling 57-79 percent of the payments to producers depending on whether we include only the 6.5 These figures are, arguably, not in line with the expectations from the EU Commission and the Swedish government that the TGC system would be cost-efficient in terms of low consumer costs, nor that it should avoid overcompensation to power producers, as emphasized by the Swedish Government. On the contrary, the TGC system has turned into a "rentgenerating machine". The Swedish TGC scheme performs, therefore, badly not only in terms of consumer costs but also with respect to equity. 
System outcomes III: TGC as a driver for technology development
As shown in section 2, a TGC scheme was expected to stimulate technical change and drive down costs. This theme is a recurring one in the Swedish policy literature (e.g. in various
Government bills). For instance, a TGC will "… give rise to a market dynamic that create the conditions for cost efficiency and technical change" (Swedish Government, 2000, p. 1).
That market dynamic influence technical change is well-known in the field of innovation studies, where the close relationship between technical change (and cost reduction) and diffusion has been emphasised for a long time. This is, for example, reflected in the literature on so-called "learning curves" (e.g. Neij et al., 2003) that describe how an increase in performance, or reduction in costs, stimulates diffusion which, in turn, generates opportunities for more learning. In part, these opportunities stem from the larger funds available for R&D among capital goods suppliers as their sales increase (Klepper, 1997) , but they are more general than so (Kemp et al., 1998; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) .
This means that it is not enough for a government to fund R&D, pilot plants and the occasional demonstration plant for a learning process to unfold. Learning and technical change is dependent on market formation. This market formation needs to be started very early on and in parallel to R&D support -the process is not linear (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986 ).
In an early phase, diffusion rests on the formation of nursing markets, where the new technology is protected from competition for quite a long time, often decades. These nursing markets may be conventional niche markets, where the new technology is superior in some dimension, but in the energy field they are often created through some kind of state support, e.g. in the form of demonstration programmes. 45 Although very small, these markets are strategic in terms of technical change since they create a base for learning and self-reinforcing processes which enable the new technology to begin to improve its price/performance ratio and to adjust to the demand from specific segments (Kemp et al., 1998; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004; Suurs, 2009) , There is, though, a large discrepancy between the demand from these early niche markets and the fully commercial mass market. Bridging markets may, therefore, need to form to allow for different types of self-reinforcing process to gain strength (Andersson and Jacobsson, 2000) .
Without nursing and bridging markets, there is little incentive for capital goods suppliers to enter into the new industry and provide resources for product, process and market development. Without a capital goods industry being formed, learning is limited to that taking place in academic R&D organisations. The link between policy, market formation and technical change goes, therefore, via the capital goods industry. This link is particularly strong in early phases where an initially immature, expensive and poorly performing technology is embarking on a long learning process. By forming initial markets, policy may induce firms to enter into the capital goods industry and take the new technology through this process. Initial markets are, therefore, necessary for the new technology to be put "on the shelf" (Sandén and Azar, 2005) .
As an example of successful market formation and capital goods industry development, we may take the German wind turbine case. German support to wind turbines from the mid-1970s
and forward induced the entry of about 14 firms in the period 1977-91 (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) . The initial nursing market was very small: in 1989, about 15 years after the start of the wind turbine programme, the total installed effect of wind turbines was only 20 MW (221 turbines) (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003) . This was followed by the formation of a bridging market in the form of a 250 MW demonstration programme with investment subsidies. This market was 12 times large as the initial nursing market and strongly supported 45 See Jacobsson and Bergek (2004) and Stern (2006) with respect to some of the reasons for the need for intervention to form initial markets. Bergek and Jacobsson (2003) and BWE (2009)) This growth created a large space for the German wind turbine industry. More firms entered and a division of labour emerged in a growing industrial system (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003) . A substantial learning process followed, which most notably involved a rapid upscaling of the turbines. The capital goods suppliers' contribution to technical change was reflected in a learning effect which was in parity with the Danish (Neij et al., 2003) . Today
Germany accounts for about 30 percent of EU's supply of wind turbines (compared to Denmark's 40 percent) (EWEA, 2009a) and 35 percent of the direct employment in the European wind industry (EWEA, 2009b) . 46 The capital goods suppliers benefitted from this generous support both by the creation of a domestic market and by the transfer of some of the support to the capital goods suppliers through high equipment prices, which to a large part were used for technology development (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003) . In addition, German turbine manufacturers were partly protected from competition from the Danish firms through the design of federal and local support systems, which ensured them a 50 % share of the German market.
Both nursing and bridging markets can, thus, be rather small; contrast the figures above for wind power (20 and 250 MW respectively) with the situation in 2008, when the German installed effect of wind turbines was almost 24,000 MW (Figure 6 .1)! However, these markets were still instrumental in setting in motion learning processes that eventually led to the development of a range of domestic turbine alternatives to the more established Danish wind turbine industry.
How, then, does the TGC scheme compare with this? As noted above, TGC systems create a "technology-neutral" market where all eligible technologies compete. This leads, of course, to a step-wise investment pattern where the lowest cost technologies are included first:
"A basic principle of the system was that the different renewable energy sources should compete with each others so that the most cost efficient electricity production is built first. Only thereafter may the more expensive production be gradually built as the level of ambition (the quota) is raised" (Swedish Government, 2006b, p. 106) .
A TGC scheme, thus, creates a market for relatively mature technologies (Midtun and Gautesen, 2007) , whereas immature technologies are locked out, perhaps for an extended period of time (unless the quota is raised to a very high level). This means that it applies to early mass markets, for which more mature technologies are available (see Figure 6 .2). It needs to be emphasized that this is not an unintended consequence of this regulatory framework. It is rather a basic principle that investment should be made"…at a rate that is economically justified and not prematurely" (Swedish Ministry of Industry, 2002, s. 38 On the other hand, the focus on relatively mature technologies implies that TGC cannot be expected to drive technical change in the first vital few decades in a new technology's life.
Nor can it be expected to contribute to generating an early and supportive home base for Swedish capital goods firms. A "gap" has, therefore, been created in the Swedish policy package between R&D, pilot projects/occasional demonstration plant and the more mass market flavoured TGC scheme. This gap means that Swedish policy does not provide a space for learning where firms establish themselves early in the capital goods industry and invest resources into technology and market development.
Please note that the size of the nursing market is greatly exaggerated in comparison to the other markets. To conclude, without an early home market, Swedish firms are placed in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis firms operating in countries with an early home market (i.e. countries with 48 SKF and ABB are though present as component suppliers to the international wind turbine industry. 49 Metso Power, a Finish firm, owns since a few years back a unit in Sweden, the origin of which are two Swedish firms (Götaverken and Generator). These were previously owned by the Norwegian firm Kvaerner. Some years ago, Kvaerner acquired the Finish firm Tampella and restructured the business so that most boiler manufacturing became located in Finland. There is still though a strong design competence in Sweden as well as service capabilities and production of smaller boilers (Olofsson, 2005 
Concluding discussion and some lessons learned
The purpose of this paper was to assess the performance of the Swedish TGC system, contributing to the European-level debate on the suitability of different types of schemes for the support of renewable electricity production. The expectations of the TGC system were that it would: a) substantially increase the output of electricity generated from renewable energy sources; b) ensure that the supply of 'green' power was to be done in a cost effective manner (from both a social and a consumer perspective); c) generate an equitable distribution of costs and benefits and d) increase the competitiveness of electricity from renewable energy sources through driving technical change.
To what extent have these expectations been fulfilled? The expectation in terms of effectiveness is likely to be fulfilled. Although the supply of new 'green' power lags somewhat behind expectations, 50 the TGC scheme has strongly contributed to a considerable interest among firms to invest in biomass CHP and wind turbines. This is likely to increase further as the quota is raised to 25 TWh. As compared to the situation in the 1990s, this is a dramatic change. In this, the scheme must be judged to be successful. It may also be judged successful in terms of minimising the short term social costs of achieving the first set target.
With all likelihood, the expansion of 'green' power has hitherto been achieved at a low social cost in Sweden (in particular in the form of biopower).
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Whereas the TGC may, so far, pass on the effectiveness criterion, it certainly does not pass on the cost effectiveness criterion if we, as both the Swedish government and the Commission, 50 A contributing factor is the currently long lead times for the delivery of new plants. As it takes a lot of time to build new industrial capacities, we would expect these lead times to stay long for some time. 51 This does not mean, however, that the scheme will necessarily be cost effective in the longer term. As argued in Jacobsson et al., (2009) , cost effectiveness in the long run is close connected to the ability of the scheme to drive technical change. As the TGC scheme fares poorly in that respect, it can only be cost effective in the long term if the capital goods can be imported from countries with regulatory frameworks that drive technical change and the formation of capital goods industries.
interpret this in terms of also consumer costs. The cost for the consumers have so far greatly exceeded expectations, with certificate prices and payments by electricity consumers far higher than those that were described in the inquiries preceding the TGC system. Substantial transactions cost can also be noted in the Swedish TGC system. Assuming that no further sources of rents emerge, this would constitute a share of rents of up to 29 percent of the payments to producers. The TGC scheme is, indeed, a rent-generating machine! These rents mean that the TGC scheme does not pass on the Swedish Government criteria of equity, avoiding overcompensation (to the power industry) and securing the legitimacy of the system, a point also emphasised by the European Commission (1999). The big risk of these rents is, however, not that it threatens the legitimacy of the TGC scheme but that of renewable energy technology (obstructing the Government's ambition of securing a "third leg" in the Swedish power balance (in addition to nuclear and hydro power).
With regards to
This feature ought not to come as a surprise. The ease of expanding output in already existing plants and the difficulties involved in designing the system to avoid overcompensation to power producers was well described by the government committee of inquiry investigating the future TGC system in Sweden:
"According to our opinion, the expansion in existing plants can occur soon after the introduction of the certificate system. It can come about with moderate or zero investments and small changeover efforts, e.g. through fuel conversion and increased amount of full-load hours." (SOU 2001:77, p. 74) "One of the difficulties is to construct the model so that existing plants will not be strongly overcompensated, with consequent excess costs for the consumers, as new investments will be given adequate cost coverage." (SOU 2001:77, p. 158) .
Interestingly, however, we have in no official Swedish documents before or after the system was launched come across any calculations of neither potential nor actual rents. This is, indeed, remarkable as it is obviously so that a very large share of the turnover of the scheme is wasted in the sense that it could have been used to fund a much higher level of investments in renewable energy technology.
The TGC scheme also fails in terms of driving technical change. The substantial rents are reaped by investors in relatively mature technologies, which imply that they are not, as appropriate in a market economy, the reward to successful entrepreneurs developing and applying relatively immature technologies. The TGC system is deliberately designed so as not to stimulate early nursing and bridging markets, where those that invest in new energy technologies, as well as those capital goods firms who develop such technologies, are rewarded. The expectations on the TGC system to be driving technical change consequently neglects two fundamental features of the development of new technologies: a) longer term learning processes as a source of innovations and cost reductions and b) the role of the capital goods industry in these learning processes.
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A "gap" has, therefore, been created in the Swedish policy package between R&D, pilot projects/occasional demonstration plant and the TGC scheme. This gap points to a very large opportunity cost of the massive rents generated within the Swedish TGC scheme. These rents are the result of legislation and can, therefore, be regarded as a tax that is collected by industry. 54 A simple example is to compare these with the annual public expenditure on energy R&D, which was SEK 875 million in 2008. Of greater importance is the lack of funds for larger demonstration programmes to fill the gap referred to above, for instance for off shore wind, wave, tidal and solar power as well as alternative fuels, such as gasified biomass.
Recently, the government decided to scale up the funding to such plants and allocated SEK 875 million to a demonstration programme for renewable fuel and power. This is, so far at least, seen as a one-off program where the funding will be dispersed over 3-4 years. With access to the rents generated within the TGC system (perhaps SEK 23 billion in the period 2003-2014 only, see Table 5 .1), RD&D funding could have been greatly increased, improving the opportunities for Swedish capital goods firms to contribute to the process of technical change.
Given this outcome of the Swedish TGC system, it is fair to say that such a scheme should be selected if the overriding concern is to minimize short term social costs of reaching a certain goal (e.g. fulfil an EU Directive) with a high degree of predictability. However, it is clearly unreasonable to have an ambition that the TGC should also drive technical change, keep consumer costs down and be equitable.
There are, thus, trade-offs involved in selecting a support system. Choosing a TGC scheme implies that the significance of rents and the importance of driving technical change/creating opportunities for industrial development would need to be played down dramatically. Other alternatives should be sought if a) society values opportunities for industrial development and technical change and b) it is deemed important to keep rents down and by implication, maximise the production of renewable power in relation to the support given to industry.
These trade-offs were, however, not identified neither by the European Commission (1999) nor in various policy documents in Sweden prior to the 'selection' of a TGC scheme. Indeed, they were obscured by arguments claiming that TGC would lead to both static efficiency (in terms of both social and consumer cost) 55 and technical change. In this expectation, there is a striking similarity between the European Commission (1999) and various Swedish government propositions and reports. This suggests that there were shared beliefs between EU and Swedish policy makers, as argued by Åstrand (2005) .
Indeed, Sweden had in the 1990s, encouraged by the European Commission, gone through a massive deregulation of e.g. the power and telecommunication sectors and it is not far-fetched that the same thinking was now applied to renewable power. 56 However, it is a vast difference between deregulating mature industries (where it is likely that the twin benefits of cost 55 Perhaps the lack of attention given to rents can be traced to an initial ambition of the Swedish TGC scheme to adding only 10 TWh by 2010 combined with expectations of very low certificate prices. Under these circumstances, the issue of rents may, perhaps, not be so pressing. Yet, the introduction of the TGC scheme is a part of a process of building a 'third leg' in the Swedish power balance. In the longer term, this would mean a capacity to supply about 50TWh (one third) of the power. Assessing the scheme in that light would presumably have led to an identification of the issue of rents early on. 56 See European Commission (1999) for a reference on this point.
reduction and innovation will be achieved) and building up new industries. Policy makers must appreciate these differences and design policies accordingly. 'One size fits all' policies must, therefore, be avoided. a We assume that existing/"easily accessible" production will be phased out according to Column E. 2003 -2014 (with certificate price 300 SEK 2009 -2014 and 500 SEK 2015 -2030 
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Source: Elaboration on Swedish Government (2006a)
